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DAMAGES RECOVERABLE IN A PARTIAL TAKING*
by
John S. Palmore**
I. SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
ANY TIME governmental action has the effect of diminishing a
person's right to use or dispose of his property as he sees fit, a "taking"
occurs. In this broad sense a zoning regulation amounts to a partial taking
with respect to all property affected by it.1 But for the purposes of this
discussion the term "partial taking" will be confined to the acquisition by
condemnation of the entire title to a tangible and physically separable
portion of a privately owned tract or parcel of real estate, leaving the re-
maining portion in its previous ownership.
In some jurisdictions the diminution in value resulting to the portion
not taken is called "resulting damage" or "damage to the remainder." In
others the terms "consequential damage" and "severance damage" are
commonly used. For our purposes these expressions may be considered
as referring to the same thing, although it should be recognized that
"consequential damages" are not always limited to cases of partial taking.!
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use "without just compen-
sation. ' Similar provisions are made in most of the state constitutions,
and all the states are bound to the same effect by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.4
It is readily apparent that the problem of measuring just compensation
ordinarily will be more difficult in the case of a partial taking than in the
instance of a complete taking. All of the valuation principles applicable
to a complete taking apply also to a partial taking.' The additional diffi-
culty arises principally with respect to the effect of the taking on the re-
mainder tract.
Despite variations in the formulae by which the end result is reached,
and differences as to what factors of loss are compensable and admissible
in evidence, the courts seems to be unanimous in holding that the constitu-
Originally published for the Southwestern Legal Foundation's Eighth Institute on Eminent
Domain and reprinted with permission of the copyright owner, Matthew Bender & Co.
** LL.B., University of Louisville; Judge, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Frankfort, Kentucky.
' So long as it is not unreasonable, such a taking comes within the police powers of the state
and is not compensable. If it exceeds the bounds of the police power, it is either invalid or it must
be treated under the principles of eminent domain. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
24 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 14.1, 14.2 (1962) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
'U.S. CONST. amend. V.
' Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
54 NICHOLS 5 14.1.
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tional right to compensation for property taken includes severance dam-
ages (if any) in partial-taking cases."
III. MEASURE OF RECOVERY
There are two methods of measuring compensation in partial-taking
cases. The usual one, which for convenience will be called the "value plus
damage" rule, is to assess separately (at least in the evidence, if not in the
verdict) the value of the portion taken and the "damages" to the remain-
der and add the two together. The other is the "before and after" rule, in
which the evidence and verdict are directed to the difference in market
value between what the condemnee owned immediately before the taking
and what he owned immediately thereafter.
This basic divergence originates mainly because in a good many states
the constitutional guarantee of "just compensation" means, in effect, com-
pensation in money for the property taken, disregarding compensation in
the form of actual or theoretical enhancement to the value of the re-
mainder tract by reason of the use to which the condemned portion is to
be put.7 Indeed, that was the accepted principle in Kentucky until 1963
and, subject to various modifications, apparently still prevails in most
states either by case law, statute, or express constitutional qualification!
If severance damage, or resulting damage to the remainder, falls within
the constitutional guarantee of just compensation, it would seem that
there is no sound basis for distinguishing between the value of the land
taken and the diminution in value of the land remaining. If benefits may
be offset against the one, they ought to be offset against both, and that is
the net effect of the simple "before and after" rule. Nonetheless, in several
jurisdictions the distinction is made, and the offsetting of benefits is con-
fined to the amount allowed for damage to the remainder.9 Thus, for ex-
ample, in Texas the "value plus damage" formula has been expressed as the
value of the land actually taken plus the difference in value of the re-
mainder before and after the taking." From state to state there are further
variations, such as the differentiation in Arkansas, California and Kansas
between condemnations in favor of private corporations and those in
favor of the public. 1
The Supreme Court of the United States held long ago that offsetting
an increase in the value of the remainder against the value of the portion
taken does not offend the Federal Constitution."5 Text writers agree that
8 Cf. United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911); Baumann v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897);
4 NICHOLS § 14.2; 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN S 48 (2d ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as ORGEL].
727 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 362 (1966); 4 NICHOLS 55 14.23, 14.232(1); Cf. OKLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 24.
s See Annot., 145 A.L.R. 7, 156 (1943). Summaries of this phase of the law in each jurisdiction
appear in 3 NICHOLS § 8.6211.
'Cf. Highway Comm'n v. Gray, 197 La. 942, 2 So. 2d 654, 660-61 (1941); Davidson County
Bd. of Educ. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 202 Tenn. 9, 301 S.W.2d 905, 907 (1957) ; Dawson v. State,
391 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), dismissed by agreement.
" Wallace v. Van Zandt County, 264 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
"ARK. CONST. art. II, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14; KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 4.
12Baumann v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
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the "before and after" rule is superior to the artificial approach inherent
in any of the various forms of -the "value plus damage" rule. 3 The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, which exercises plenary dominion over matters
of procedure, decided in 1963 that statutes requiring use of the "value
plus damage" formula were invalid under the Kentucky Constitution, and
adopted the "before and after" rule without qualification except as to
loss of access. 4 The Kentucky court's disenchantment with the "value
plus damage" approach resulted from the incorrigible disposition of valu-
ation witnesses and juries to duplicate damages by including, in the assess-
ment of damages to the remainder, compensation for the loss of advantages
that inhere in the value of the portion taken.
The diverse state of the law on offsetting benefits has been conveniently
summarized by the Supreme Court of New Mexico as follows:
By general benefits are meant those benefits which the adjoining land-
owner shares in common with the public generally. By special benefits we
mean those benefits resulting from a public work which enhance the value of
the land not taken because of their advantageous relation to the improvement.
... When such incidental benefits exist the distinctions which may be drawn
between the two factors, benefit and injury, have been variously combined by
the courts. Lewis, in Volume 2 of his treatise on Eminent Domain (3d ed.
1918) at page 1177, groups their treatment by the courts into five main
classifications: (1) that the benefits cannot be considered at all . . . ; (2)
that special benefits may be set off against damages to the remainder but not
against the value of the part taken . . . ; (3) that benefits, whether general
or special, may be set off only against the damages to the remainder; (4) that
special benefits may be set off against both damages to the remainder and the
value of the part taken; and (5) that both special and general benefits may
be set off against damages to the remainder and the value of the part taken."
Without belaboring the subject, suffice it to say that the real measure
of damages in any partial-taking case boils down to or at least seeks to
achieve the same result as the "before and after" rule, subject to modifica-
tions necessitated by the local law with respect to such matters as benefits
and noncompensability of loss of access.
IV. ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE
Frontage Value. As in the instance of the basic measure of damages, the
provable elements or factors bearing upon the increase or decrease in value
of the remainder tract vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and are sig-
nificantly affected by the extent to which benefits are allowable as an
offset.
Bearing in mind that market value is the price a willing buyer would
give and a willing seller would take, neither being under any compulsion,
obviously the price paid for street or highway frontage in a private sale
will include whatever diminution in value results (or has resulted at some
133 NICHOLS § 8.6206(1); 4 NICHOLS § 14.232(1); 1 ORGEL § 52.
14 Department of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844, 857 (Ky. 1963). See also Department
of Highways v. Conley, 386 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Ky. 1965).
5 Board of Comm'rs v. Gardner, 57 N.M. 478, 260 P.2d 682, 684 (1953). New Mexico follows
the "before and after" rule. State v. Atchison T. & S,F. Ry., 76 N,M. 587, 417 P.;4 68 (1966).
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time in the past) to the remainder by reason of its loss of direct access to
the public thoroughfare."8 Comparable sales introduced by the landowner
in a condemnation proceeding almost always will reflect that factor. But
in a street or highway condemnation case, unless the plans contemplate
limited access or non-access, that factor usually will not or should not be
present. Hence the prices paid in private sales for comparable property
constitute highly deceptive evidence in favor of the landowner. In states
using the "before and after" rule there is no problem since the after-value
of the remainder parcel includes its frontage value, but, in states that do
not permit the offsetting of benefits to the remainder against the award for
the portion taken, the result may be that the landowner gets paid for
something he has not lost-that is, the frontage value.
An interesting case involving this precise point came before the Court
of Appeals of Arizona early this year.1' In Arizona "the state must pay
for the value of the property taken, regardless of the benefits to the re-
maining property.""8 The owners contended they were entitled to the full
value of the frontage taken, though they had substantially the same front-
age left after the taking. In a thorough and highly instructive opinion the
court resolved the dilemma by concluding that in the ordinary street-
widening case "frontage" has no special value and the jury should be in-
structed substantially to that effect. Contrary decisions by the courts of
Texas, California and Hawaii are noted in the opinion."9
As pointed out in an earlier decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals,'
the problem arises with the introduction of comparable sales, and this is
the stage of the trial at which the fallacy should be attacked and exposed
through cross-examination. With all deference to the courts that have de-
cided otherwise, it is submitted that in a simple street- or highway-widen-
ing case the condemnor does not acquire frontage and should not be made
to pay for it. To the extent that access remains undiminished the frontage
is undisturbed. It is not taken, but merely relocated. The remainder parcel
is damaged, of course, to the extent that its depth is reduced or for some
other reason is less advantageously situated than before the portion was
taken, but it is not "benefited" by the frontage, because as a part of the
original tract it enjoyed that same benefit before the taking.
Loss of Access. With the interstate highway program, loss of access has
become a common problem. Farmer Jones, whose place used to front on a
two-lane highway, now has to go three miles down a gravel service road
to get onto what is now a four-lane divided superhighway; or he can now
go in only one direction where he used to be able to turn either way; or
perhaps half of his frontage is now occupied by a deceleration lane or a
"eCf. Department of Highways v. Finley, 371 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Ky. 1963); Frenel v. Common-
wealth, 331 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1960).
17 Deer Valley Indus. Park Dev. & Loan Co. v. State, 5 Ariz. App. 150, 424 P.2d 192 (1967).
18424 P.2d at 196.
19People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Silveira, 236 Cal. App. 2d 604, 46 Cal. Rptr. 260
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Territory v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979 (1961); State v. Meyer,
403 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. 1966).
"
0 Department of Highways v. Finley, 371 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Ky. 1963).
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clover-leaf ramp. The Court of Appeals of Arizona has stated a concise
and well-reasoned exposition of the general rule:
When the controlled-access highway is constructed upon the right-of-way
of the conventional highway and the owner's ingress and egress to abutting
property has been destroyed or substantially impaired, he may recover damages
therefore. . . . Other means of access such as frontage roads . . . may be
taken into consideration in determining the amount which would be just
under the circumstances."1
The opposite viewpoint is illustrated by an Arkansas opinion of the
same vintage, which in substance holds that the substitution of a frontage
road in lieu of direct access to the highway is essentially a diversion of
traffic authorized under the police power of the state and is not a com-
pensable damage factor."2 In Kentucky, the courts hold that the landowner
has no more than a right of "reasonable access to the highway system" and
that all interferences with regard to convenience of access which do not
deprive him of that right come within the police power."
An example of the latter principle occurred in a case in which, incident
to a street-widening adjacent to a motel, curbside parking was prohibited.'
This was held to be a noncompensable item of damage because the public
authority had the same power to prohibit parking on the newly widened
portion as it would have had to discontinue parking on the original street.
Sometimes under the "reasonable access" theory a question will arise as
to whether the new means of access is truly reasonable, and whether that
is an issue for the jury or the court. Thus far, the Court of Appeals in
Kentucky has been inclined to say as a matter of law that so long as the
owner is given a connection with the public highway system, no matter
how much farther he must travel to reach the new highway, or to reach
town, he cannot recover.' Even though this may seem harsh, the prin-
ciple is that whatever value property has by reason of its proximity to a
public highway was conferred upon it at public expense and may, within
reason, be terminated without public liability. " There is, of course, a limit.
In one case the right-of-way of a frontage road provided by the state
coincided with the landowner's boundary line along the thread of a creek. 7
Needless to say, the state's contention that "reasonable access" had been
provided was rejected. A landowner who has been able to reach the high-
way without the aid of a bridge or culvert cannot reasonably be put to
" State v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988, 992 (1960).
2State Highway Comm'n v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728 (1960). See also State
v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 384 P.2d 241, 246 (1963), reaching the same result without reliance
upon the police power, and other decisions, pro and con, footnoted in the opinion.
23Commonwealth v. Carlisle, 363 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1962). See also Department of Highways
v. Denny, 385 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1964); Department of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844, 859
(Ky. 1963). Whether this theory would apply if the landowner has previously been charged for
the benefit conferred on his property by the initial construction of the highway, or has had the
cost of a street construction or improvement assessed against the property, is an interesting question
not thus far decided in Kentucky.
"Department of Highways v. Mayes, 388 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1965).
'Department of Highways v. Claypool, 405 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1966).
26 Id. at 676.
27 Department of Highways v. Adkins, 396 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1965).
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the necessity of building one in order to regain access to the highway
system. s
In jurisdictions that do not permit recovery based on loss of direct
access a practical trial problem is presented by the necessity of separating
that factor from the other considerations affecting the residual value of
the remainder tract. As in the instance of frontage, the question arises
when a witness undertakes to discuss the diminished value of, or damage
to, the remainder. The Kentucky approach (however unsatisfactory it
may be from a practical standpoint) has been to require the witness
to base his estimate on the hypothesis that the property still has access as
before, 9 with an appropriate admonition to the jury (if requested).a" This
is an interesting converse of the "let's pretend" situation that exists in
states that do not allow benefits to be considered, when the expert witness
must base his opinion on what the remainder tract would be worth, or how
much it would be damaged, if the condemned portion of the property
were not to be used as a street or highway."
Inconvenience. The matter of inconvenience frequently arises when land
is divided by a strip taken for a new highway. Barns and pasture land
may be left on one side and the water supply on the other. Such incon-
venience is generally allowed as a proper item for consideration.2a In a
recent case the Supreme Court of Oklahoma said without qualification
that "in Oklahoma the rule long applied is that the jury is entitled to
consider inconvenience, which interferes with the owner's use and enjoy-
ment of his property, in assessing damages."' However, since the objec-
tive sought in most if not all jurisdictions is to measure the damage in
terms of loss of market value (subject, as pointed out heretofore, to differ-
ences in treatment of access and benefits), it seems more logical to confine
such evidence to those matters of inconvenience which really affect the
market value. As stated by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, "The in-
convenience to be considered is not that which is peculiar to one who by
reason of age, disinclination or preference may react . . . adversely to the
readjustment of his boundaries. The test is the extent to which those,
whose present or prospective interest will create a market value, will take
these factors into account."'
Again the subject of benefits is encountered. It may be, and often is,
that the remaining parcels have greater value as separate tracts, and per-
haps the highest and best use of one or both will be different from what it
was before. Often the new highway frontage will convert farm land into
highly desirable residential or commercial property. Under the "before
and after" rule the question of inconvenience becomes irrelevant unless
" Department of Highways v. Dotson, 405 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1966).
29Department of Highways v. Claypool, 405 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1966).
"Department of Highways v. Adkins, 396 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1965).
31 Cf. Hamer v. State Highway Comm'n, 250 Iowa 1228, 98 N.W.2d 746, 748 (1959); Pearl
River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 172 So. 2d 196, 207 (Miss. 1965); Finley v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 291 P.2d 333, 336 (Okla. 1955).
324 NICHOLS § 14.243.
"Turnpike Authority v. Burk, 415 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okla. 1966).
'State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 202 Miss. 488, 490, 32 So. 2d 268, 270 (1947).
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the highest and best use remains the same, and unless the highest value of
the remaining property is still as a single unit rather than separate parcels.
In Kentucky the courts have been frequently confronted with this
problem, usually when trial counsel have not been careful to develop the
subject of whether the remaining property has greater value as a unit or
as separate parcels. In one case it is said that "[t]he fact that the separate
parcels into which the farm has been split cannot feasibly be operated as
a single unit has no relevance except as may be given as a value-affecting
factor by a witness who testified that the separate parcels would bring less
on the market, sold as separate parcels, than they would bring if they
could be sold as a single unit."' Later, however, it was decided that the
burden of proof in this respect should rest on the condemnor, and that
"where a farm is involved and no evidence is introduced by either party,
it may be assumed the 'highest and best use' of the farm is that of 'farm-
ing' and that its highest value is as a single unit."3 The net result is that
inconvenience and interference in continuing to use the property as it was
being used before the taking is admissible as a value-affecting factor unless
it is clearly shown that the remainder parcels will have greater value if
sold separately.
Fencing and Restoration Costs. Consideration of whether the highest and
best use of property left after the taking remains the same as it was before
leads naturally into the subject of restoration costs-that is, to what extent
is it proper to prove what it will cost to restore fencing and improvements,
or take other measures designed to minimize or offset the effect of the
taking?
It seems to be the generally prevailing rule that the cost of fencing
made reasonably necessary by the taking is admissible in evidence, whether
as a separately compensable item or as information relevant to the diminu-
tion in value of the remainder." The condemnation statutes of Kentucky at
one time required that fencing be allowed as a separate item, and for many
years after the requirement disappeared from the statutes it remained a
part of the law,3 until in 1963 the court shifted course to enter the main
current of the "before and after" rule."
Naturally, the price a purchaser is willing to pay for a piece of real
property will reflect the cost of work necessary to make it usable for the
intended purpose. Hence under any theory the cost of the work if in fact it
is necessary, is relevant evidence. There are, however, certain definite pit-
falls in the admission of this type of evidence. First and most obvious is the
tendency toward duplication. In states that follow the "value plus dam-
age" rule the landlord should be awarded the value of his old fence as part
of the amount awarded for the portion taken. If he is then permitted to
show the cost of a new fence as bearing on the diminished value of the
"sDepartment of Highways v. Burns, 394 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Ky. 1965).
'0 Department of Highways v. Sea, 402 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Ky. 1966).
3727 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 313 (1966); 4 NICHOLS § 14.24321.
"Greenup County v. Redmond, 335 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Ky. 1960).
"Department of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 884, 854 (Ky. 1963).
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remainder, he collects twice. This happened in a Kentucky case, before the
adoption of the "before and after" rule, in which the award for the portion
taken included an amount for a parking area in front of an apartment
house.' The witnesses for the owners based their estimates of the reduction
in value of the remainder on the lack of parking space. The judgment was
therefore reversed.
The other treacherous aspect of this kind of evidence is that, regardless
of how desirable the projected expenditure is, it may not be strictly neces-
sary, and cost may also exceed the amount by which it enhances the mar-
ket value. Particularly is this true if the highest and best use of the prop-
erty in its new situation is different from that before the taking. For ex-
ample, if new highway frontage through a farm makes the land more
valuable for subdivision purposes, construction of fences and cattle cross-
ings will add nothing, and certainly the purchaser who would pay the
highest price would not find it necessary to provide them.
All property has both advantages and disadvantages that contribute
to or detract from its value. Swamp land has to be drained. Rough land
has to be leveled, and streets have to be put in, in order for it to be sub-
divided and sold as building lots. A residential lot must have a house built
on it before its highest and best use is attained. It is all too easy to go far
afield and into the realm of speculation in figuring what expenditures are
necessary to restore property to its former use or adapt it to its highest
and best use. The safest course, and the one adopted in Kentucky, is to
stick as closely as possible to simple before and after values, on an "as is"
basis. A farm without a fence has a market value "as is." One purchaser
might put up a wire fence, another a plank fence. One costs more and
adds more value than the other. A choice between the two in a condemna-
tion proceeding, even on the basis of what kind was there in the first place,
is purely arbitrary and introduces conjecture. It is submitted that except
under the most extraordinary circumstances (for example, the replace-
ment of a wall in a building), projected cost figures should not be admit-
ted or used in evidence, and the valuation witness should be confined to an
enumeration or description of those things which in his opinion must be
done in order to adapt or restore the property to its highest and best use
and which, presumably, a prospective buyer would take into consideration
in arriving at the price he would be willing to pay for it.
V. LEASEHOLDS
An instructive and unique case dealing with the apportionment of a
partial taking between landlord and tenant is the Kentucky decision of
Department of Highways v. Sherrod." This, incidentally, is the case in
which the Kentucky court abandoned the "value plus damage" rule in
favor of the "before and after" rule.
In 1960 the state condemned a strip of land for the widening of a high-
way. The parcel included a leased restaurant building and related struc-
'Commonwealth v. Blanton, 352 S.W.2d 545 (Ky. 1962).
4' )67 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963).
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tures. The lease could run to 1975 at the option of the lessee. In the aggre-
gate, the landowners were awarded $31,075 and the lessee $41,215, includ-
ing "$28,350 as damages for the portion of the leasehold taken, $4,150 as
resulting damages to the leasehold interest, $215 for use of a temporary
easement, and $8,500 for loss of business during the highway construc-
tion period."'
That portion of the award to the lessee for diminution in value of the
leasehold was based on an instruction incorporating the general rule that a
lessee is entitled to the fair rental value minus the actual rent over the un-
expired term of the lease.' However, the trial court failed to instruct on
how it was to be applied when only a part and not all of the leased prop-
erty is taken.
Most of the states, including Kentucky, follow the "undivided fee" rule,
under which total compensation is limited to the market value of the real
estate, as distinguished from the sum of the different interests therein."
After that determination is made, the simplest approach is to evaluate the
lessee's interest and subtract it from the total, the difference being the
value of the landlord's interest.
In reversing, the court of appeals came to the conclusion that the value
of a lease is the difference between what a willing buyer would pay the
landlord for the property free and clear of the lease and what he would
pay for it subject to the lease, as in the case of easements to which the
premises might happen to be subservient. This means that the lease has
value only to the extent that the lessee is obligated to pay less rent than
the property would bring if the landlord were free to lease it anew. For
example, if the property rents for $600 per year but at the current rate for
comparable property could be rented under the same terms and conditions
to another equally reliable tenant for $1,200 per year, the landlord's in-
vestment is returning $600 less per annum than it should, and theoretical-
ly the price a buyer would pay would be reduced by the amount required
to offset the difference in income over the remaining life of the lease. Con-
versely, the lessee, if free to do so, could assign his lease to another tenant
at a profit of $600 per annum. Hence the value of the lease to him is the
same amount-that is, the sum necessary to purchase an annuity that will
return him $600 per annum for the remainder of the lease term.
If the rent is exactly what it ought to be, the benefits and the burdens
are equal and the lease has no value. The landlord should be able to find
another tenant for the same rent and under comparable terms, and the
tenant should be able to lease comparable premises under similar terms at
no increase in rental.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky adheres to the theory, right or
wrong, that a lease does not add to the value of the property, as such. If
the rent is greater than is justified by current and prospective market con-
ditions, the value to the landlord over and above what a buyer would
4 2 Id. at 847.
4327 AM. JuR. 2d Eminent Domain § 352 (1966); 4 NICHOLS S 12.42(3).
44 Cf. 4 NICHOLS § 12.36.
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pay for the property free and clear of the lease is an anticipated profit
from his contract, which is frustrated by the condemnation, and, as in the
instance of a business interruption, the loss is not compensable.
The opinion goes on to say that these principles apply whether the lease
be for a short or long term and regardless of whether the lessee is entitled
to any abatement of his rental obligation. (On the latter point the court
may well have taken a little too cavalier an attitude.) If the lessee's inter-
est is found to have value (and in nearly all cases it will have value if the
tenant has added improvements that will be owned by the landlord at the
expiration of the lease), the presumption is made that it is reduced in the
same proportion as the value of the unencumbered fee would be reduced.
Three questions are submitted to the jury:
A. What was the market value of the property as a whole immedi-
ately before the taking, if sold free and clear of the lease?
B. What was its market value at that time if sold subject to the lease?
C. What was the market value of the property left immediately after
the taking, if sold free and clear of the lease?
That is all that needs to be ascertained. The rest is a matter of computa-
tion, which is done by the trial judge. C subtracted from A gives the
total amount of the award. If B is equal to or more than A, the landlord
gets it all and the lessee receives nothing. If B is less than A, the difference
is the value of the lessee's interest immediately before the taking. This
difference is divided by A [ (A-B) /A] to obtain the percentage of the
award that goes to the lessee. The balance goes to the landlord.'
No doubt the Sherrod case represents a conservative adherence to the
"market value" concepts which have pervaded the law of eminent domain
against the facts of life, and possibly it will be criticized as reactionary
and unrealistic.'6 To the objection that the Sherrod approach requires a lot
of guesswork, the author would reply that so do all condemnation cases.
If they could be worked out on a slide rule, trials would be unnecessary.
VI. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON "UNDIVIDED FEE" RULE
In closing, one other problem that was encountered in the Sherrod case
and that sometimes arises in other factual situations deserves consideration.
The leased property in Sherrod was a 150-foot by 250-foot portion of a
twelve-acre tract. Without delving into the problem of what constitutes
a single unit of property for purposes of condemnation,4 ' suffice it to say
that in Sherrod the court directed that the leased portion be treated as an
independent tract, separate from the remainder of the twelve acres, for the
stated reason that "the application of the formula would be confusing if
the leased land and the land not leased were treated as a single unit."
Sometimes the separate treatment of different portions or different in-
45 Department of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Ky. 1963).
" Cf. 1 ORGEL § 77; Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L. Rnv. 477
(1962). See also Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 286 (1949).4 7 Cf. 4 NICHOLS S 14.31; Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1197 (1949).
"
8 Department of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844, 851, 852 (Ky. 1963).
1967]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
terests in a single piece of property is unavoidable. For example, Farmer
Jones owns a 100-acre tract of land, but the oil or coal rights, or all the
mineral rights, are part of a 500-acre block of mineral rights owned by
someone else. The state condemns a strip through the 100 acres. Technical-
ly, under the "undivided fee" and "before and after" rules the court would
have to begin with the before-value of the 500-acre fee as if it were not
fragmented, and then sift out the respective ownerships, and so on. Prob-
ably no court would carry theory to that extreme. The practical solution
is to recognize an exception to the "undivided fee" rule and treat the 100-
acre surface title and the 500-acre mineral title as separate units. '
VII. CONCLUSION
Frankly, the law of eminent domain almost universally is too restrictive.
Dispossessed condemnees ought to be made whole, regardless of market
value concepts. They should be paid for moving expenses, damage to busi-
ness, loss of access (especially in those states which allow the offsetting of
benefits), and other items of expense occasioned by the involuntary dis-
ruption of their affairs. Perhaps the reluctance of courts to move in that
direction is founded on an unspoken policy of protecting the public treas-
ury. If so, it is just as indefensible as the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The public treasury ought not to be preserved by a process of discrimina-
tion that is inconsistent with the principles under which it was created.
On the other hand, the policy may be justified on the theory that the
average jury can be expected to overcompensate the condemnee anyway,
and a tight rein helps keep the scales in balance.
49 Cf. Department of Highways v. Chapman, 391 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1965).
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